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Focusing on the advanced political economies, this paper critically reviews the recent scholarship 
on the evolution of top incomes over the past few decades. The existing literature shows that the 
determination of top incomes is complex and multifaceted, and is bound up with factors associated 
with both politics and economics. Technological change and globalization are vital sources of 
change in contemporary capitalism, but the continued diversity in top income shares across the 
advanced capitalist world suggests that these forces alone cannot account for the empirical 
patterns. Instead, there is compelling evidence that power and politics, including government 
policy, trade union and left party strength, institutions, and financialization, all play a pivotal role 
in regulating distributive outcomes. It is argued that future research will require a plurality of 
methodological approaches in order to clarify the complex causal process that drives top-end 
income concentration. 
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Common ground is hard to find in our polarized age. But one issue has been a source of agreement 
for a diverse group, ranging from Bill Gates to Pope Francis, and from the World Economic 
Forum to Oxfam. Although they disagree on how to address it, these disparate voices form part 
of a growing global consensus that income inequality is a serious concern (Wike, 2013). Income 
inequality has become one of the defining issues of contemporary capitalism, and growing income 
disparities have been blamed for a number of societal ills, including financial instability, rising 
populism, ecological destruction, and various health problems (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010). With 
increasing attention focused on inequality, terms like the ‘one percent’ and the ‘ninety-nine percent’ 
have entered into popular discourse. Academics, politicians, activists, and journalists, now use 
these statistical categories as shorthand for the groups involved in political struggles around the 
distribution of income.  
 
Recent empirical research on top incomes has provided much of the impetus for the burgeoning 
interest in inequality (e.g. Alvaredo et al., 2013; Alvaredo et al., 2017; Piketty, 2014). Two key 
findings have emerged from this research. First, the income share of the top one percent has risen 
across the advanced capitalist world since the early 1980s. Second, despite recent increases, there 
is still considerable cross-national diversity in top incomes. In parts of continental Europe and 
Scandinavia, the top percentile’s income share has increased only very slightly over the past few 
decades and remains low today. Yet in the English-speaking world, and especially in the United 
States, the top percentile’s share has surged, climbing to levels not seen since the early twentieth 
century.  
 
These empirical patterns point to an interesting puzzle. How do we account for this continued 
diversity in top incomes in the advanced political economies? What are the principal causes of 
these historical and cross-national variations in distributive outcomes at the top? Why does the US 
stand out as an extreme case of top-end income concentration? With reference to these questions, 
the purpose of this state-of-the-art will be to critically review the recent literature on top incomes. 
This review is needed precisely because most of the action has taken place at the apex of the 
income hierarchy. In the most unequal societies, gains at the very top have propelled changes in 
the overall distribution of income A specific focus on top incomes is also warranted because the 
forces that concentrate income at the top may be unique in comparison to the other facets of 
income inequality (Autor, 2014; Huber et al., 2015: pp. 18-19). Insightful reviews of top incomes 
already exist (Keister, 2014; Keister and Lee, 2014; Kenworthy, 2017; McCall and Percheski, 2014; 
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Medeiros and Ferreira de Souza, 2015). But an in-depth review of the state-of-the-art on the cross-
national variations in top incomes in the advanced political economies has yet to be developed. 
The discussion here has particular relevance for the wider literature on comparative capitalisms 
and the debate on how best to identify and explain cross-national patterns of convergence and 
divergence (Deeg and Jackson, 2007).  
 
What the existing literature reveals is that the determination of top incomes is complex and 
multifaceted. The evolution of top income shares cannot be simply reduced to market processes 
of globalization and technological change. Although market processes can act as powerful forces 
for income dispersion, continued diversity in top incomes points to a need to move beyond 
markets and examine the role of political and social factors. One of these factors is government 
policy. In particular, marginal top income tax rates have been identified as a key policy predictor: 
countries that have reduced top rates the most have seen the largest increases in top income shares. 
Important as government policy may be, it can, however, only serve as a proximate cause of 
variations in top incomes across time and space. To get at the ultimate causes of this variance, a 
recent body of literature points to power and politics in explaining distributive outcomes. Taking 
cues from power resources theory, this literature shows the decisive role of left party and trade 
union strength, financialization, and political institutions in shaping top-end income concentration 
in the advanced political economies.   
 
Though the study of top incomes has come a long way in a short period, there are still many 
avenues for further exploration. The bulk of cross-national empirical evidence on the drivers of 
top incomes is derived from ‘panel-of-countries’ regression analysis (Atkinson and Brandolini, 
2006). These studies help to pinpoint the causal factors associated with cross-national variation of 
top incomes. But the causal process at work is highly complex and is arguably best tackled with a 
plurality of methodological approaches. As a complement to panel-of-countries approaches, case 
studies and small-N comparisons have the potential to garner rich and detailed information on the 
complex interplay of factors that shape the evolution of top incomes across time and space.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two outlines the trends in top incomes 
across the advanced capitalist world. The next four sections of the paper then discuss the various 
explanations that have been given for these trends. Section three focuses on the market story, 
which emphasizes the role of technological change and globalization; section four looks at the role 
of government policy, especially top marginal income tax rates; and sections five and six survey 
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the literature on power and politics. To derive a sense of the bigger picture, section seven distills 
the key findings of existing studies, and proposes several avenues for future research. Section eight 
concludes with a brief summary.  
 
2. Trends in Top Incomes 
 
In Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Thomas Piketty (2014, p. 3) notes that historical debates about 
distribution were based on ‘a relatively limited set of firmly established facts together with a wide 
variety of purely theoretical speculations.’ But in recent years all this has changed. In the span of a 
couple of decades, the empirical record has improved so that researchers now have an extensive 
grasp of the historical and cross-national patterns of wealth and income distribution. What was 
once, in Piketty’s (2014, p. 2) words, a ‘debate without data,’ has become a vibrant area of research, 
with coverage being extended both historically and geographically, and with measures and 
techniques becoming ever more refined.  
 
The empirical work of Piketty and his collaborators has focused on mapping the income shares of 
top earners (e.g. top decile, top percentile, top 0.001 percent). Top income measures have two key 
advantages over the more conventional Gini coefficient (Alvaredo et al., 2017, pp. 27-30; Atkinson 
et al., 2011, pp. 19-29). First, Gini measures are based on a small sample of household surveys, 
and therefore tend to underestimate the overall magnitude of inequality (Burkhauser et al., 2012, 
pp. 371-372). These samples are likely to miss out on the superrich, which make up a tiny portion 
of the population. High non-response rates amongst the superrich mean that the problem persists 
even with oversampling. Top income measures rely instead on administrative tax data, which offer 
a much larger sample of the population, with greater historical coverage. Even with tax evasion, 
top incomes reported in tax data are consistently higher than those reported in surveys (Alvaredo 
et al., 2017, p. 30). Second, the Gini elegantly expresses inequality through a single number, but it 
cannot illuminate which groups are driving distributional changes. As Alvaredo et al. (2017, p. 27) 
explain, a country may experience an increase in the top income share alongside declining poverty 
in the bottom of the distribution. If these two changes offset each other, the Gini remains 
constant. This gives the false impression that the distribution of income is not changing, when in 
fact the income share of the middle class is being squeezed. Similar issues plagued earlier estimates 
of top incomes, as tax data cover only the taxpaying population. Only the rich were subject to 
income tax in the early years of its existence, making it impossible to estimate the income shares 
of groups further down the distributional hierarchy (Atkinson et al., 2011). But recent advances in 
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measurement techniques overcome these limitations (Piketty et al., 2018). Combining tax, survey, 
and national accounts data, these new techniques allow researchers to identify the groups driving 
changes in the overall distribution (e.g. bottom 50 percent, middle 40 percent, top 10 percent, etc.).  
 
Figure 1 encapsulates some of the main findings on patterns of top incomes for the advanced 
political economies in 1976-1980 and 2010-2014. All of the countries that appear in this figure 
have experienced some increase in income inequality over the past few decades. Yet what the 
figure also shows is that there is still considerable diversity in the share of income going to the top 
one percent. The top percentile’s share of income increased only slightly in Denmark and the 
Netherlands, but it roughly doubled in countries like Sweden, the US, and the United Kingdom. 
In the most recent years for which data are available, the income share of the top percentile is low 
in the Netherlands (6.4 percent) and Denmark (6.4 percent), moderate in Japan (10.4 percent) and 
France (10.9 percent), and high in Germany (13.1 percent) and Canada (13.3). The US is a 
noticeable outlier at the high end of the scale, with the top percentile now taking a 20 percent 
share of income.  
 
<Figure 1 here> 
 
For advanced political economies with the highest levels of inequality, gains at the top have also 
fueled disparities in the overall distribution of income. Table 1, based on data from the World 
Inequality Report 2018, illustrates these dynamics (Alvaredo et al., 2017, pp. 45-46). In more unequal 
North America, the income of the total population grew by 63 percent from 1980 to 2016, but 
this growth was highly skewed in favour of those at the top. The top decile in North America 
captured 67 percent of total income growth over this period, and over half of those gains went to 
the top percentile. In more equal Europe, even with the inclusion of the highly unequal UK, the 
total income growth, and the percentages of income captured, are more evenly spread across the 
distribution.  
 
<Table 1 here> 
 
Figure 2 provides further evidence of how gains at the top are fueling inequality in the most 
unequal societies. Panel A in the figure shows the average income ratios for various groups in the 
US from 1962 to 2014. The average income of someone in the top percentile was 32 times higher 
than someone in the bottom 50 percent in the early 1960s and 80 times higher in 2014. In the early 
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1960s the ratio of the top percentile’s average income to the middle 40 percent (i.e. the fiftieth to 
the ninetieth percentile) was 11, and almost doubled to 20 by 2014. At the same time, the relative 
income increases of the next nine (i.e. the ninetieth to the ninety-ninth percentile) have been more 
modest: they increased from 7 to 12 times larger than the bottom 50 percent but have hardly 
moved relative to the middle 40 percent. As Panel B in the figure shows, the situation in more 
equal France has been completely different. Since the early 1960s, the average incomes of the top 
percentile and the next nine percent have both declined relative to the middle 40 percent and the 
bottom 50 percent.   
 
<Figure 2 here> 
 
One final development worth mentioning is the changing composition of top incomes in the 
advanced political economies. Income from capital (dividends, interest, rents, etc.) remains vital 
to those at the top, but labour income (wages, salaries, stock options, etc.) has become much more 
central since the 1980s. In contrast to the nineteenth century image of the rich as idle rentiers 
living off investments, those at the top of the income hierarchy today tend to be the working rich 
(Atkinson et al., 2010, p. 690; OECD, 2011, pp. 350-351).  
 
3. Technological Change and Globalization: A Story of Markets  
 
How do we account for these trends in top incomes? One approach suggests that rising inequality 
is a result of market processes. Anchored in the neoclassical marginal productivity theory, this 
literature emphasizes how changes in the supply and demand for the various factors of production 
bring about shifts in the distribution of income (Mankiw, 2013). Ever since the pioneering work 
of Jan Tinbergen (1975), technology has served as a necessary reference point for studies of income 
inequality. In simple terms, technological change has raised the demand for, and in turn, the 
remuneration of, workers with the requisite skills and education. Low-skilled workers that fail to 
adapt to advances in technology are faced with unemployment and wage stagnation. Thus, for the 
‘skill-biased technological change’ argument, rising inequality is the outcome of a race between 
education and technology (Goldin and Katz, 2008). Wage differentials result primarily from 
differentials in the quantity and quality of education (ibid., pp. 2-3). 
 
Initially developed to explain general changes in income inequality, technology is also invoked to 
explain runaway increases in top incomes. For example, the ‘superstar’ theory maintains that top 
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earners have scarce and unique talents (Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Kaplan and Rauh, 2013; Rosen, 
1981). Recent advances in information and communications technology have expanded the scale 
of markets for these talents, resulting in substantial pay increases for superstar athletes, 
entertainers, investors, and managers (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2011).  
 
In the market-based analysis, globalization aids and abets the un-equalizing tendencies of 
technological change. What Tinbergen is to the technology side of this story, Eli Heckscher and 
Bertil Ohlin are to the globalization side. Anchored in the assumption of Ricardian comparative 
advantage, the Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts that international trade will reward the owners of 
the abundant factors of production and harm the owners of the scarce factors within a given 
country (Heckscher and Ohlin, 1991). Over the past four decades, free trade has brought about a 
‘geographical reallocation of global production,’ with developing countries specializing in 
unskilled, labour-intensive goods and advanced countries specializing in capital and technology-
intensive goods (Bourguignon, 2015, pp. 76-77). People in the bottom of the income distribution 
tend to own unskilled labour, while ownership of capital and high skilled labour are concentrated 
at the top. Since unskilled labour is the relatively scarce factor in advanced countries, the model 
predicts that globalization will bring wage stagnation and unemployment for unskilled workers, as 
workers from developing countries, especially from China and India, enter into the global labour 
market. Capital and high skilled labour, the comparatively scarce factor in advanced countries, will 
see income gains from globalization, boosting returns and expanding the scale of the market for 
top-end talent (Kaplan and Rauh, 2013, p. 53).  
 
While trade globalization has dominated the market story, less attention has been paid to financial 
globalization (Ernst and Escudero, 2008, p. 40; Jaumotte et al., 2013, p. 274). When it comes to 
the distributive effects of foreign direct investment (FDI), the Hecksher-Ohlin theorem leads to a 
simple prediction. Assuming that capital flows from capital abundant (advanced) countries to 
capital scarce (developing) countries, FDI will increase inequality for both sender and receiver. 
This is because relatively high skill-intensive inward FDI for the developing country is often low 
skill-intensive outward FDI for the advanced country (Jaumotte et al., 2013, p. 284). FDI flows 
from advanced to developing countries therefore increase the relative demand for skilled labour 
in both countries, exacerbating top-end income inequality in both (ibid., p. 285).  
 
At its core, the market story is focused on skills, and specifically, on the differential capacities of 
factor owners to adapt to the exogenous forces of technological change and globalization. Some 
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evidence suggests that market processes are central to the explanation of rising income inequality 
more generally (Autor, 2014; Huber and Stephens, 2014; cf. Handel, 2003). But there are 
compelling reasons to doubt whether the skills-centered market story can account for changing 
patterns of top incomes across time and space.  
 
Consider, first of all, runaway incomes at the very top in some advanced political economies. As 
mentioned earlier, most of the increases in top incomes have been driven by gains at the apex of 
the hierarchy. But as Piketty (2014, p. 314) explains, there is little to differentiate members of the 
top decile in terms of their skills, including years of education, educational quality, or professional 
experience. The skills-centered market account runs into further trouble in relation to income gains 
within the top percentile. Members of the top percentile display even greater uniformity in skills 
than the top decile, and yet from 1980-2014 the pre-tax income growth of the top 0.01 percent in 
the US was more than double that of the top one percent (Piketty et al., 2018, p. 578).  
 
If the advanced political economies are equally subjected to the exogenous forces of technology 
and globalization, then the market story falls short simply because of the considerable variation in 
top incomes shown in Figure 1. But what if technological change and globalization are treated as 
explanatory variables rather than exogenous constraints? Several cross-national studies, involving 
panel-of-countries regression analysis, have explored empirically the impact of technology and 
globalization on top income shares.  
 
As shown in Table 2, these studies provide conflicting evidence for the market story. Dünhaupt’s 
(2014) proxies for technological change and financial globalization show no significant effect on 
the top percentile’s share of income, while trade openness compresses top income shares. Huber 
et al. (2017) report no significant impact for globalization on top incomes, while technological 
change reduces them. Taking a longer-term perspective, Roine et al. (2009) find that trade 
openness slightly compresses top income shares, while technological change is insignificant. 
Others report precisely the opposite. Flaherty’s (2015) weighted index of economic globalization 
is shown to have no impact on top income shares. But his measures of trade openness and financial 
globalization are both found to significantly enhance the income share of the top percentile (see 
also Neal, 2013). To complicate matters further, Cabral, et al. (2016) find that financial 
globalization has a large positive impact on top income shares.   
 
<Table 2 here> 
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Conflicting results in the existing studies bring into doubt the market story as a definitive 
explanation for top incomes in advanced political economies. Technological change and 
globalization may act as powerful forces for income dispersion. But continued cross-national 
diversity suggests that there are other factors that influence both the magnitude and the rate of 
change in top income shares. What are these other factors? In recent years, a growing body of 
literature has augmented the market story by analysing the role of government policy in shaping 
distributive outcomes at the top.  
 
4. Enter Government Policy 
 
The effects of government policy on the distribution of income are wide-ranging. In broad terms, 
government sets the rules for the market, and so labour market and financial market regulations, 
education policy, as well as laws governing property rights, monopoly, contract, licensing, and 
bankruptcy, are all potential determinants of top incomes (Piketty et al., 2014; Reich, 2015).1 In 
their book Fed Power, Desmond King and Lawrence Jacobs (2016, p. 3) scrutinize the role of 
monetary policy as an ‘inequality generator,’ particularly in the US. In the lead-up to the global 
financial crisis, the Federal Reserve fuelled inequality by prioritizing price stability over 
employment (despite its dual mandate). In the aftermath of the crisis, quantitative easing favored 
the superrich by inflating asset prices. Due to controversies surrounding their crisis response, 
central bank officials in the US, the UK, and the Eurozone, have now been drawn into a debate 
about the distributive impact of monetary policy (Giles, 2014).  
 
Despite these wide-ranging effects, the most frequently cited role of government in shaping top 
incomes is through fiscal policy. Progressive taxation and transfer payments redistribute income 
downward and reduce the post-tax income share of those at the top. Tax policies can also have an 
indirect impact on pre-tax income, as lower marginal income tax rates provide incentives for top 
earners, especially corporate executives, to either work harder and invest more money, or to grab 
‘rents’ and bargain for higher compensation (Piketty et al., 2014; Kenworthy, 2016).2  
 
The most reliable data on the direct effect of taxes on post-tax top incomes is for the US. Piketty 
et al. (2018, p. 598), argue that the declining progressivity of the US fiscal system has contributed 
to rising inequality. Their findings show that the US system of taxes and transfers is slightly 
progressive, but that the gap between the effective tax rates of the top percentile and the bottom 
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half of the population has steadily narrowed since the 1950s. They attribute the decline in the 
effective tax rate on top incomes primarily to falling corporate and estate taxes, which took around 
20 percent of the top percentile’s income share in the 1960s, but only 10 percent in 2014 (ibid.: 
600).3  
 
Data on the indirect effects of taxation on pre-tax top incomes are more extensive and offer 
reasonably consistent findings. On the whole, existing studies identify a significant correlation 
between top marginal income tax rates and pre-tax top income shares (Neal, 2013, pp. 94-95; 
Scheve and Stasavage, 2016, p. 76). For most advanced countries, top marginal tax rates have 
declined since the early 1980s, but the depth of these cuts has varied considerably (Alvaredo et al., 
2013, p. 7). In France in 2010, the top tax rate was only 10 percent lower than it was in 1950, while 
in the US it was 50 percent lower (ibid., p. 7). Cross-nationally, tax cuts are strongly correlated with 
rising top incomes. At the firm level, there is a significant correlation between lower top marginal 
income tax rates and higher CEO pay in different countries (Piketty et al., 2014, p. 263-266).  
 
There is ample evidence to suggest that government policy, especially fiscal policy, plays a crucial 
role in shaping top incomes in advanced political economies. But this observation merely raises 
another question. How exactly do we explain the variations in the policies that influence 
distributive outcomes? According to Piketty (2014, pp. 330-335), the answer boils down to a 
combination of political and social factors: namely, changing ‘social norms’ and the relative 
bargaining power of social groups. Yet as Piketty (2017, p. 562) himself admits, these factors ‘often 
appear exogenous and exterior’ to his analysis (Jacobs, 2017).  
 
Lane Kenworthy (2016) offers a simple but persuasive example of how political and social factors 
may not be exogenous but integral to the evolution of top incomes. As he observes, not only are 
top marginal tax rates strongly correlated with pre-tax top income shares, but the relationship 
between them grows stronger over time. In other words, top tax rates and top income shares were 
weakly correlated in the post-war period (1960-1964), but more recently (2005-2009) this 
correlation is much tighter (Piketty et al., 2014, p. 253). According to Kenworthy (2016), this 
change may have to do with shifting relations of power between social groups. He posits that the 
strength of unions in the post-war period may have allowed workers to resist executive pay 
increases, even in the wake of substantial cuts to top marginal rates, like those implemented by the 
Kennedy Administration in the US in 1963. Nowadays, with unions considerably weakened, CEOs 
face far less opposition when boosting their pay in response to tax cuts.  
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Kenworthy’s hypothesis is entirely plausible, and the example illustrates the importance of placing 
political and social factors, especially power relations, at the center of the analysis. There is a long 
tradition in the social sciences literature of situating power and politics into the analysis of 
distributive outcomes. The insights from this literature have been incorporated into the study of 
top incomes, resulting in a more holistic, systemic, and cross-disciplinary account of their evolution 
across time and space.  
 
5. Power and Politics (I): Partisanship and Trade Unions 
 
Much of the discussion within the existing literature on power relations and institutions is animated 
by power resources theory (PRT) (Brady et al., 2013, p. 875). Originally developed in the late-
1970s and early-1980s to explain cross-national variation in welfare state regimes (Korpi, 1983; 
Stephens, 1979), PRT also offers a more general framework for analyzing income distribution and 
has been the main theoretical reference point in the literature on top incomes (Dünhaupt, 2014; 
Flaherty, 2015; Hacker and Pierson, 2010; Huber et al., 2017; Volscho and Kelly, 2012). 
 
Inspired by Marx’s class analysis, the ‘classic’ formulations of PRT take the structural cleavage in 
capitalist societies between workers and capitalists as their analytical point of departure (Huber et 
al. 2017, p. 19). The main resource of workers is their labour power; for capitalists, it is the 
ownership of economic assets. Unlike labour power, economic assets are easily transferable, scarce, 
and concentrated. Workers thus find themselves at a structural disadvantage in capitalist society: 
they are legally free to sell (or more accurately rent) their labour power on the market, but in doing 
so they must submit to the control of management during the workday (Stephens, 1979, pp. 18-
19).  
 
One of the core claims of PRT is that employees can decrease their structural disadvantage by 
banding together in unions and left-wing political parties. Worker influence thus depends on the 
degree of unionization, and the degree of centralization in wage bargaining. The idea is that unions 
and collective bargaining enhance worker power by enabling them to overcome collective action 
problems. Thus, unions and left parties empower employees to pry concessions from employers, 
who are otherwise narrowly interested in profit-making. In this way, PRT prioritizes power and 
class conflict in explaining distributive outcomes (McCarthy, 2017, p. 20). The prediction of PRT 
is straightforward: as the power of unions and left-wing parties increases, income inequality should 
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decrease. In a modified class framework, the top one percent implicitly serves as a rough proxy 
for a capitalist class of top executives and major shareholders, while the bottom 99 percent serves 
as a rough proxy for workers.  
 
Left (and Christian Democratic) governments are expected to implement policies, especially 
progressive income tax rates, to reduce top income shares. Unionized workers are often more 
successful in boosting wages relative to their non-unionized counterparts, reducing the amount of 
‘rent’ going to top executives and shareholders (Ahlquist, 2017, p. 8; Shin, 2014, p. 1343). In 
countries where workers are legally represented on corporate boards, unions have a crucial say in 
the setting of executive compensation and can directly oppose large increases in the ratio of CEO-
to-worker pay. Unions can also organize campaigns and rally public opinion against runaway pay 
at the top. Finally, in addition to their roles within the workplace and civil society, unions shape 
distributive outcomes through their direct involvement in the political arena, pushing for more 
egalitarian policies (Brady et al., 2013, pp. 874-876; Hacker and Pierson, 2010; Western and 
Rosenfeld, 2011, p. 518).  
 
Empirical research points to a significant role for partisanship. In the US, Bartels (2008) notes that 
the spectacular rise in the top percentile’s income share since the 1980s has proceeded apace 
regardless of which party holds the presidency (Hacker and Pierson, 2010, pp. 162-164). More 
analytically rigorous research confirms Bartels’ observation: the partisan affiliation of the president 
has little bearing on distributive outcomes at the top (Kenworthy, 2010; Volscho and Kelly, 2012, 
p. 688). But Volscho and Kelly (2012, p. 692) do find that rightward congressional shifts are 
associated with increases in the top percentile’s income share, while Keller and Kelly (2015) show 
that financial deregulation increases the income share of the top 0.01 percent. Deregulation is 
bound up with partisanship because it tends to decline when Democrats gain control of the 
presidency and the Senate.  
 
Cross-nationally, Scheve and Stasavage (2009) report a modest influence for left government on 
top income shares, while Huber et al. (2017, p. 16) find that secular center and right-wing 
governments have a large effect on top incomes. Neal (2013, p. 93) also uncovers a positive and 
significant relationship between top income shares and the ideology of the ruling party. 
 
Union strength is a central variable in PRT, and research reveals that it has a meaningful impact 
on top incomes. Evidence from the firm level in the US indicates that unionization decreases the 
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compensation of top executives by 12 percent, mostly because of lower stock-based compensation 
in unionized firms (Gomez and Tzioumis, 2011, p. 17). In US industries with a high level of 
unionization, the gap between executive and nonexecutive pay is narrower (Shin, 2014, p. 1366).  
 
It remains to be seen whether this relationship between unionization to executive compensation 
exists cross-nationally (Ahlquist, 2017, p. 9). At the aggregate level, union density has been 
declining in most advanced political economies since the early 1980s, and this decline has been 
most pronounced in those countries where top incomes have experienced the largest gains. In the 
studies surveyed in Table 2, the rate of unionization is one of the few variables that is consistently 
reported to have a meaningful impact on top incomes. These findings provide ample support for 
Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey’s (2013, pp. 1301-1303) claim that ‘[i]n previous literature, declining 
union density tends to be the single most important institutional predictor of increased income 
inequality.’ 
 
The effect of bargaining centralization on top incomes is less clear-cut. Huber et al. (2017, p. 16) 
find that the centralization of bargaining enhances the political clout of workers and provides a 
check on top income growth. Scheve and Stasavage’s (2009, pp. 233-234) study shows that over 
the past three decades decentralized (firm-level) bargaining is associated with rising inequality 
relative to sectoral bargaining. Yet their results also reveal that centralization (national-level) 
bargaining is not negatively correlated with top income shares, bringing into question the argument 
that solidaristic pay institutions have significant effects at the very top of the income distribution.  
 
To sum up, the empirical evidence provides a great deal of confirmation for the role of partisanship 
and trade unions. In line with classic PRT, partisanship has been shown to have a significant impact 
on top income shares, and union strength provides what is perhaps the most robust predictor of 
top incomes across time and space. Yet as important as political parties and unions are, they do 
not exhaust the explanation of distributive outcomes. The literature on power and politics draws 
attention to other factors outside of the scope of classic PRT. Of these other factors, political 
institutions and financialization are two of the most prominent in the determination of top 
incomes.   
 
6. Power and Politics (II): Institutions and Financialization 
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Since it first emerged, PRT has inspired a substantial literature, some of which has identified 
shortcomings in the classical formulation (see Brady, 2009). Perhaps most relevant to the study of 
top incomes is the criticism that classic PRT neglected political institutions (Brady, 2009; Iversen 
and Soskice, 2009, p. 439). Electoral systems of proportional representation tend to favor left-
wing government, while majoritarian systems favor right-wing government. Furthermore, 
presidentialism, super-majoritarianism, and bicameral legislatures, are all characterized by extensive 
veto points, which encourage policy drift and empower special interests to block progressive policy 
reforms (Huber et al., 2017). Veto points render a government susceptible to capture through 
lobbying and campaign financing, engendering a feedback loop from money to power to (more) 
money (Scheve and Stasavage, 2016, pp. 16-17; Reich, 2015, pp. 82-83).  
 
For the US, Enns et al. (2014) find that institutional design, especially the super-majoritarian 
Senate, engenders a status quo bias that increases top income shares. In their analysis, this status 
quo bias is conditional on a high degree of ideological polarization, and on an already-existing high 
level of inequality. The fact that institutional gridlock depends on high levels of inequality suggests 
that policy has been captured. Hacker and Pierson’s (2010) mostly qualitative account illustrates 
how rising inequality in the US gives the organized interests of the superrich a political advantage 
relative to middle class institutions like trade unions, allowing them to consolidate power, entrench 
the status quo, and further augment their fortunes.  
 
There are, however, reasons to question whether the logic of ‘institutional design creating gridlock 
and capture’ applies outside of the US (Scheve and Stasavage, 2016, p. 17). Problems in 
generalizing the institutional story become clear in Hopkin and Shaw’s (2016) study of ‘winner-
take-all’ politics in the UK. The UK represents a ‘most similar’ case given its own staggering levels 
of top-end inequality (see Figure 1). And yet, as Hopkin and Shaw demonstrate, the UK political 
system is strikingly different from that of the US. A centralized executive branch, along with 
effective enforcement of party discipline, insulate the UK policymaking process from capture. 
With that being said, the cross-national evidence is scant, but Huber et al. (2017, p. 16) do uncover 
a positive and statistically significant relationship between institutional veto points and top income 
shares.  
 
Recent literature has also built upon classic PRT by taking into account the role of financialization 
in altering power relations. One of the transformations associated with financialization has been 
the shift in corporate strategy toward shareholder value (van der Zwan, 2014, p. 104). According 
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to the existing literature, there are three main ways that shareholder value boosts top incomes. 
First, it leads to a rise in income from dividends, interest payments, and capital gains, which tend 
to be heavily concentrated at the top (Flaherty, 2015, p. 422). Second, in order to boost short term 
stock prices, it encourages workforce downsizing and the distribution of savings to shareholders 
through increased dividend payouts (Dünhaupt, 2014, p. 13; Jung, 2015). Third, as a strategy to 
align the interests of managers with owners, it facilitates rising executive compensation through 
enhanced performance-related pay (Dünhaupt, 2014, p. 12).  
 
Another transformation associated with financialization concerns the regime of accumulation, and 
the shift from production to finance as the center of profit-making (Krippner, 2005; van der Zwan, 
2014). Under this financialized regime of accumulation, the financial sector takes an increasing 
share of corporate profits, creating rents that are captured by top traders and managers in financial 
institutions (Godechot, 2016, p. 497). With the financializaton of accumulation, the non-financial 
sector also finds itself increasing engaged in financial activities. Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin (2011, 
p. 1294) suggest that non-financial corporations’ increasing reliance on financial income leads to 
the reallocation of resources from productive to financial units, which raises the incomes of elite 
workers at the expense of unskilled workers (see also Kus 2012, p. 485).  
 
An extensive body of evidence has found a linkage between shareholder value and rising top 
income shares. Focusing on the US, Shin (2012) analyzes the relationship between CEO 
compensation and an index of shareholder value orientation, which combines measures of 
institutional ownership, board independence, and the percentage of incentive pay in CEO 
remuneration. Shin demonstrates that US firms with a greater orientation toward shareholder value 
pay their CEOs more. There is also a temporal dimension to the analysis: when US firms 
strengthen their commitment to shareholder value, the pay of their CEOs increases the following 
year. Jung (2015, p. 1362) also finds that large US corporations with block-holding institutional 
investors and shareholder-value-oriented managers are more likely to engage in downsizing. A 
cross-national study reveals a significant gap between CEO pay in the US relative to other 
countries (Fernandes et al., 2012). The authors attribute higher executive compensation in the US 
to the ‘shareholder-centric’ nature of US corporate governance, which is proxied by institutional 
ownership and board independence.4 What is more, the study also finds that CEOs of non-US 
firms that have adopted shareholder value strategies tend to receive higher remuneration. As Table 
2 indicates, top incomes have been found to be positively and significantly correlated with dividend 
payments to shareholders (Dünhaupt, 2014; Godechot, 2016).  
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What about the financialization of the regime of accumulation? Cross-national studies offer 
conflicting assessments of the relationship between the financial sector’s share of profits and top 
incomes (Flaherty, 2015; Godechot, 2016; cf. Huber et al., 2017, p. 17). As Godechot (2016, p. 
495) points out, however, top salaries in the financial sector have been shown to be a powerful 
driver of earnings inequality in the US, France and the UK (see also Godechot, 2012).   
 
Evidence on the relationship between the financialization of non-financial corporations and top 
incomes is limited. Examining the French case, Ignacio Alvarez (2015) finds that the financial 
income of non-financial corporations is a powerful predictor of declining wage shares. For the US, 
Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey (2013) show that increasing financial income for non-financial 
corporations is associated with decreases in labour’s share of income, increases in top executives’ 
share of compensation, and greater earnings dispersion. Godechot (2016) is the only researcher to 
make a direct, cross-national, link between the financialization of non-financial corporations and 
top income shares and reports no meaningful relationship between the two.    
 
Integrating institutions and financialization into the study of top incomes adds considerable 
nuance to the classic PRT account. Though it is difficult to generalize beyond the US case, the 
institutional design of the political system matters to distributive outcomes at the top. Evidence 
shows that the rise of shareholder value has transformed power relations in the firm, fueling 
income gains for top managers and shareholders at the expense of workers. The effects of a 
financialized regime of accumulation have not been as well documented, but salaries in finance 
have been shown to be a major driver of top-end income concentration.  
 
7. The Bigger Picture 
 
What does the existing literature tell us? Perhaps the most obvious message is that there is no 
single determining factor that accounts for evolving patterns of top incomes in the advanced 
political economies over the past few decades. Income inequality is multi-faceted and complex, 
and the evolution of top incomes cannot simply be reduced to market processes. Technological 
change and globalization may act as powerful forces for concentrating income at the very top. But 
marked cross-national variation in the share of income going to the top percentile indicates that 
other factors are at play.  
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The empirical record consistently shows that government policy plays a pivotal role in shaping top 
incomes. When marginal income tax rates are slashed, top incomes soar. Yet these variations in 
policy do not simply emerge out of thin air. While political factors are largely exogenous to the 
framework of Piketty and his collaborators, more holistic, cross-disciplinary, social science 
perspectives place them at the forefront. This social science literature illustrates the importance of 
power and politics to distributive outcomes. The strength of left parties and trade unions are two 
of the most effective predictors of cross-national variation in top incomes, providing forceful 
evidence in support of PRT in its classical guise. Augmenting classic PRT to take into account 
financialization and political institutions is especially valuable for tracing the spectacular rise of top 
incomes in the US, where the orientation toward shareholder value has resulted in skyrocketing 
executive pay, and where institutional veto points create conditions for policy gridlock and capture.  
 
What the existing literature reveals is a considerable degree of causal complexity in the evolution 
of top incomes. At the heart of this causal complexity is a self-reinforcing feedback loop of income 
and power: increasing income concentration is a power resource for top earners, which they 
mobilize to shape policy and corporate strategy in their interests, which, in turn, has the effect of 
further concentrating income at the top (Huber et al,. 2017). Existing research offers a rich and 
detailed account of how this feedback loop operates in the US context, but despite recent efforts, 
top incomes in other advanced political economies have not yet been subjected to the same 
amount of careful scrutiny (Hopkin and Lynch, 2016).   
 
To be sure, the panel-of-countries analyses that dominate the cross-national study of top incomes 
are illuminating. Though they often generate conflicting results, the empirical record of these 
studies can be leveraged in order to identify consistently significant causal factors associated with 
cross-national variation of top incomes. Yet when it comes to the complex process that links causal 
factors to distributive outcomes, the regression models employed in panel-of-countries analysis 
face difficulties. Most importantly, the notion of a self-reinforcing feedback loop of income and 
power driving top-end income inequality does not lend itself to the one-way conception of 
causality assumed in standard regression analysis (Huber et al., 2015, pp. 20-21). Thus, future 
research employing case studies and small-N comparisons has the potential to complement the 
findings of panel-of-countries studies by developing a richer and more detailed set of observations 
on the complex interplay of factors that determine top incomes and their variations across time 
and space (Hall, 2003, pp. 388-389).  
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One avenue for future research would be to explore in greater depth how systems of firm 
governance in different countries affect top incomes. In existing studies, union strength is 
consistently shown to be one of the most effective predictors of top income shares. These findings 
offer compelling evidence in favour of classic PRT, but more work needs to be done to explicate 
the precise causal process at work and how it unfolds in particular institutional contexts. PRT 
emphasizes the conflictual nature of distributive outcomes. If the presence of strong unions is 
negatively correlated with top incomes, then the implication for PRT is that workers have 
successfully resisted managers and shareholders in their attempts to boost executive compensation 
and dividend payouts.  
 
Yet these firm-level dynamics may involve more than just conflict. According to the ‘varieties of 
capitalism’ (VoC) literature, distributive outcomes reflect cooperative relationships that emerge 
from national skill profiles. Production in coordinated market economies (CMEs) with relatively 
low inequality requires skills that are industry, firm, and/or country-specific (Iversen and Soskice, 
2009, p. 445). Since skills-specific production is risky for employees and employers alike, both 
actively support more egalitarian policies. Insights from both PRT and VoC could therefore be 
combined to explore the patterns of conflict and cooperation that underpin distributive outcomes 
at the firm-level (Brazys and Regan, 2017, p. 415). Huber et al. (2017, p. 19) speculate that 
management-labour cooperation may occur on the input side (e.g. skills training), but that a 
‘fundamental conflict’ over firm surplus still characterizes the output side. Strong unions are in a 
better position to cooperate with management in production but are also able to ‘win more often 
in the context for the share of the nation’s income’ (ibid., p. 19). More research into the precise 
mechanisms of wage bargaining, the setting of executive pay, the role of workers, management, 
and owners in company decision-making, will help to flesh out the firm-level dynamics of top 
income determination.  
 
Another avenue for future research would focus on the policy-making process. As mentioned 
earlier, Hopkin and Shaw’s (2016) study of the UK as a ‘most similar’ case brings into doubt the 
generalizability of Hacker and Pierson’s (2010) largely institutional account of ‘winner-take-all-
politics’ in the US. But more in-depth research is needed on the role of government institutions 
and partisan politics in explaining the evolution of top incomes in ‘most different’ cases. In other 
words, the richness and detail of Hacker and Pierson’s account of ‘winner-take-all-politics’ in the 
US could be extended to ‘winner-take-less-politics’ in countries like the Netherlands and Denmark. 
An analysis of the major events, legislative contestations, and historical turning points, would 
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garner insights into the limited growth of top incomes in these countries over the past few decades. 
This exercise would allow researchers to better gauge the extent to which these countries are 
immune to the policy capture that has allowed interest groups in the US to shape distributive 
outcomes in their favour.  
 
Finally, future research efforts would also do well to map the preferences of those at the top of 
the income hierarchy. In the US, survey data is now being collected on the political preferences of 
the top one percent (Page et al., 2013). This preliminary research confirms some of the long-
standing assumptions about the US political economy: namely, that the preferences of those at the 
top differ markedly from the rest of the population, and that policy-making outcomes tend to 
reflect the interests of the affluent. Research into the political ideology of the directors of S&P 
1500 corporations in the US shows that conservative boards pay CEOs more than liberal boards 
(Gupta and Wowak, 2016). The extension of this type of research to other countries would help 
determine whether there are variations in policy preferences at the top in different geographical 
contexts. If the top percentile’s preferences in relatively equal societies are congruent with those 
below them in the income hierarchy, then this could lend itself to more cooperative relations and 
egalitarian outcomes within the institutional machinery of both government and firm.  
 
Further research on political preferences would also provide needed sociological depth to 
categories like the top one percent. Existing studies of top incomes overwhelmingly adopt the 
traditional class framework of PRT. But rarely do these studies reflect on how well the statistical 
abstractions of deciles and percentiles translate into the categories of social class (Piketty 2014, p. 
252). At the same time, class need not be the only analytical category through which top-end 
inequality is explored. Preliminary research reveals the heavily racialized and gendered dimensions 
of the income hierarchy. In the US, whites make up 91 percent of the top percentile, but only 69 
percent of the bottom 90 percent (Keister, 2014, p. 357). Meanwhile, 97.8 percent of US 
households in the top percentile are male-led, but only 70 percent of households in the bottom 90 
percent (Keister and Lee, 2014, pp. 18-19). A picture of the cross-national variations in the gender 
composition of top incomes is only now starting to emerge (Atkinson et al., 2016). The evidence 
indicates that women’s representation in top income groups has increased over time in advanced 
political economies. But women still face a ‘glass ceiling’: they are underrepresented at the top, and 
their representation in groups at the very top is limited (Atkinson et al., 2016). Cross-nationally, 





The study of top incomes has made remarkable progress over the past decade. Thanks to the 
painstaking efforts of Piketty and his collaborators, an impressive collection of primary data on 
top incomes has now been assembled for many countries over vast stretches of time. What is 
more, the geographical and temporal scope of the data on top incomes are being constantly 
expanded, and the statistical techniques ever-more refined. The spectacular successes of these 
empirical research efforts point to the growing public interest in income inequality as one of the 
defining features of contemporary capitalism.  
 
Piketty and his collaborators offer an impressive account of how top incomes have evolved across 
time and space. Yet when it comes to the pivotal question of why continued diversity in top 
incomes still exists across the advanced capitalist world, Piketty’s analysis falls short because it 
treats politics as exogenous. Much of the analytical heavy-lifting has thus been done by other 
researchers who have systematically uncovered a complex interplay of social and political factors 
that shape distributive outcomes at the top.  
 
Despite the proliferation of research on top incomes in recent years, there is still ample room for 
further exploration. The extension of in-depth case study research beyond the US experience 
would aid our understanding of the causal processes at work in the determination of top incomes 
in various national contexts. Given what is at stake, researchers should feel plenty of motivation 
to undertake further in-depth research of top income shares. After all, rising income inequality 
comes with serious consequences. The better the grasp researchers have of the causes of top-end 
income concentration, the more effective they will be in assessing what, if anything, can be done 
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1 In addition to an active role, Hacker and Pierson (2010, pp. 170-171) explain how policy ‘drift’ – a term which 
‘describes the politically driven failure of public policies to adapt to the shifting realities of a dynamic economy and 
society’ – influences distributive outcomes.  
2 Another aspect of fiscal policy relevant to top incomes is tax evasion. In a landmark study, Alstadsæter et al. (2017) 
estimate the distribution of offshore wealth for Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. They find that on average three 
percent of total personal taxes are evaded, which rises to about 30 percent for people in the top 0.01 percent of wealth 
distribution. According to their estimate, the top 0.01 percent owns about 50 percent of offshore wealth, representing 
about 25 percent of its total wealth.  
3 The top percentile in the US has received less than one percent of all transfer payments over the past few decades. 
Although transfer payments influence distribution of income within the bottom 99 percent, they do not reveal much 
about the spectacular gains at the top (see Hager, 2014, pp. 174-176; Hager, 2016, pp. 45-47).   
4 According to Fernandes et al. (2012, p. 361), the CEO pay discrepancy between shareholder-centric and non-




more likely to agree with the wider literature that explains rising executive pay in terms of rent extraction and 





Figure 1 Income Shares of the Top One Percent in Various Countries, 1976-1980 and 2010-2014 
Note: Calulations are based on simple averages. Data are pre-tax national income. 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 Total Cumulative Real Income Growth 
Per Adult, 1980-2016 
Share of Real Income Growth Captured 
by Income Groups, 1980-2016 
 Europe Canada-USA Europe Canada-USA 
Full population 40% 63% 100% 100% 
Bottom 50% 26% 5% 14% 2% 
Middle 40% 34% 44% 38% 32% 
Top 10% 58% 123% 48% 67% 
Top 1% 72% 206% 18% 35% 
Top 0.1% 76% 320% 7% 18% 
Top 0.01% 87% 452% 3% 9% 
Top 0.001% 120% 629% 1% 4% 
 
Table 1 Top-End Income Concentration: Europe Versus North America 
 
Note: Income calculated at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). 25 Western and Eastern European countries are 
included in the Europe grouping. 
 




Figure 2 Top-End Income Concentration: USA versus France 
 
Note: Average incomes are calculated at purchasing power parity (PPP) 
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Table 2 The Main Findings of ‘Panel-of-Countries’ Approaches to Top Incomes 
 
 
Author(s)  Years  Countries  Measure(s) Method(s) Findings 
Cabral, García-
Díaz, and Varella 
Mollick. 2016. 
1970-2004 12 developed 
and 3 developing 
countries 
 
Five classes from 
top 10% to top 
0.1% 
SGMM [+ve]: financial openness (external assets and liabilities % GDP and 
equity cross-holding % GDP). [-ve]: top marginal tax rates. [no effect]: 
population growth, GDP per capita, trade openness (imports and 
exports % GDP), central government spending % GDP.  
 





GINI and top 
1% 
 
OLS (fixed and 
random effects) 
 
[+ve]: stock market capitalization, net dividend payments of non-
financial corporations. [-ve]: union density, trade openness (imports 
and exports % GDP), GDP per capita and top marginal tax rates. [no 
effect]: left cabinet strength (left government party seats as % of total 
legislative seats), FDI outflows as % GDP, technological change (ratio 
of business expenditure on R&D to GDP). 
 






MODEL #1 [+ve]: trade openness (imports and exports % GDP), 
economic globalization (weighted index of FDI stocks, portfolio 
investment, trade and income payments to foreign nationals), 
unemployment rate, FIRE operating surplus. [-ve]: government 
consumption % GDP, union density, labour’s share of national 
income. [no effect]: accession of women to labour force, stock market 
capitalization % of GDP, private sector credit % of GDP. MODEL 
#2 [+ve]: financial globalization (external assets and liabilities % GDP), 
GINI, banking sector liberalization, banking sector supervision, 
financial reform. [-ve]: capital taxation (levies on capital transfers or 





Godechot. 2016.  1970-2011 18 OECD 
countries 
Top 10%, Top 





[+ve]: finance and insurance % GDP, union density, volume of stocks 
traded % GDP, shares in bank assets % GDP. [-ve]: imports, non-
financial firms’ financial income % gross operating surplus, non-
financial firms’ financial assets % GDP, household debt % GDP. [no 
effect]: GDP per capita, household mutual funds % GDP. 
 
Huber, Huo, 
Stephens. 2017.  






(fixed effects and 
random effects) 
[+ve]: stock market capitalization % GDP, secular center and right 
government % seats of all governing parties, veto points (index of 
presidentialism, bicameralism, federalism, and referenda), private 
tertiary education spending % total tertiary education spending. [-ve]: 
union density and centralization, codetermination rights of works 
councils, top marginal tax rates. [no effect] value added of financial 
intermediation % GDP, outward FDI, capital market openness, trade 
openness (imports and exports % GDP), GDP per capita, welfare state 
spending. 
 




OLS [+ve]: economic openness (imports and exports % GDP), conservative 
political ideology, technological change (stock of domestic patents). [-
ve]: union density, government size (ratio of central government 















Rich (top 1%), 
upper middle 
class, 90 to 99th 
GLS 
 
[+ve]: GDP per capita, financial development (bank deposits and stock 
market capitalization). [-ve]: banking crises, top marginal tax rates. [no 





exports % GDP), technological change (agricultural share of 
production % GDP, stock of domestic patents).  
 
Scheve and 





Top 1%, top 10 
to 1%, top 10% 
OLS [+ve]: decentralized (firm-level) bargaining relative to sectoral 
bargaining. [-ve]: left government, union density. [no effect]: centralized 
(national-level) wage bargaining relative to sectoral bargaining.  
 
 
